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This essay takes up both the direct and the indirect effect of WTO law within the U.S. 
legal system.  It also attempts to explain the relative absence of such effects—that is, the weak 
status of WTO law within the U.S. legal system--from a political economic perspective.  Finally 
it considers the prospects for including direct or indirect effect for WTO law in a future 
multilateral agreement.   
 
The force of WTO rules within any country’s domestic law depends on several concepts, 
the most basic of which are direct effect and supremacy.1  The question of supremacy arises only 
if the rules at issue first have direct effect.  For convenience and simplicity I will discuss direct 
effect as a single concept—meaning that for WTO rules to have direct effect a private person 
must have standing in a domestic court to base a legal claim directly on a WTO provision as a 
rule of decision.   
 
In the United States even when an international agreement has direct effect it never has 
supremacy.  A subsequent federal statute always overrides a prior self-executing (having direct 
effect) international agreement.  The only way a form of supremacy could be given to an 
international agreement in the United States would be through a statute similar to the 1972 
European Communities Act or the 1998 Human Rights Act, both in the United Kingdom.2  
These acts rely essentially on an instruction to courts to interpret subsequent statutes as 
subordinate to European Community law and the European Human Rights Convention, 
respectively, unless the subsequent statute is explicit about its intent to contravene the relevant 
treaty.  In today’s world it is unimaginable that any such act concerning WTO law could be 
enacted in the United States. Thus for all practical purposes, WTO supremacy is excluded as an 
option for the U.S. legal system.   
 
                                                 
1 See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 328-
366 (2000);  John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 
86 Amer. J. Int’l L. 310-340 (1992).   
2  On the 1972 European Communities Act, see Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU 
LAW—TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 301-312 (3d ed. 2003).  On the 1998 Human 
Rights Act, see John Wadham & Helen Mountfield, HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (2d ed. 2000). 
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Several further distinctions will arise in the body of this essay.  Direct effect could 
attach either to the WTO agreements themselves or to WTO Panel and Appellate Body rulings, 
or to both.  As we will see, it attaches to neither, but the analytical distinction is important.   
 
Finally, even when an agreement does not have direct effect in U.S. law, it may be given 
indirect effect, by which I mean that it can be used as a controlling source for interpreting 
ambiguous domestic statutes.  Once again the possibility arises of indirect effect attaching either 
to the WTO agreements themselves or to Panel and Appellate Body rulings, or to both.  As we 
will see, it seems to attach to neither in the United States—or at least it does not do so in more 
than a highly qualified or muted sense concerning the WTO agreements and not at all, 
concerning dispute settlement rulings.  
 
The essay is divided into three fundamental parts.  First it describes the current status of 
WTO law within the U.S. legal system, a status of almost fire-wall-like separation between the 
international and domestic spheres.  Second it asks why this state of affairs exists, and seeks 
answers in political economy and public-choice theory.  Finally it asks whether in the future 
WTO law is likely to be given more recognition within the domestic legal systems of the United 
States and other member states. 
 
One further introductory comment is in order.  Merely asking these kinds of questions 
suggests a predisposition in favor of direct effect for the WTO.  I have tried to resist that 
orientation by taking a positive analytical, rather than normative approach.  It is certainly true, 
however, that all the essays in this symposium collection presuppose the value of the WTO and 
ask how it can more effectively propel its members into a more open, integrated, and harmonious 
world trading system, the vision that inspired Cordell Hull decades ago to support reciprocal 
trade agreements and the ITO/GATT system.     
 
It is also true that many writers have argued for WTO direct effect in pursuit of that goal. 
Writing in the mid-1980's, for example, Jan Tumlir argued that leading countries should agree to 
entrench in domestic law the principle of non-discrimination in trade policy, raising it to a level 
parallel to the civil rights notion of equality before the law.3   He understood that that idea 
“conflicts with political instincts and habits of thought formed over very long periods of time.”4 
Still he seemed to hope for a breakthrough that would deputize private legal action to advance 
the cause of liberal trade.5 
                                                 
3 See Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 61-72 
(1985).   
4 Jan Tumlir, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 71-72 
(1985).   
5 For other writers favoring WTO direct effect see, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s 
essay in this volume;  Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European and International Constitutional Law: 
Time for Promoting ACosmopolitan Democracy@ in the WTO, in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne 
Scott (eds.) THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 81-110 
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Experience in European Community law with the transformative consequences of 
direct effect ushered in by the pathbreaking Van Gend & Loos6 decision also encourages the 
thought that similar effects should be possible within the WTO system.  But the allure of the 
parallels can be misleading, as deeper study of the two systems suggests.7  I will return to this 
point later in the essay.   
  
II. The Applicability of WTO Law within the U.S. Legal System 
 
A. Direct Effect 
 
Although international agreements sometimes have direct effect in U.S. law, it is not 
necessary to revisit this complex topic to conclude that no such effect attaches to the  WTO 
agreements.  The unambiguous provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)8 
settle the matter.  The URAA is the vehicle through which Congress amended U.S. law to 
implement the new obligations undertaken in the WTO and at the same time to give final 
authority for the United States to become a party to the WTO and its annexed agreements.   
 
The URAA provides in section 102 (a) that no provision of the WTO agreements will 
have effect within the United States if it is “inconsistent with any law of the United States . . .”9  
This clearly refers to prior, as well as  subsequent, U.S. law.   Note that even were a WTO 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2001) and sources cited therein; Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law 
in the United States and the Euruopean Union, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 556 (1997).   
6 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,  
1963 E.C.R. 1.  On the importance and transformative effect of this decision, see the seminal 
article, J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 2431 (1991) (noting 
that this case helped usher into the European Community “a level of integration similar to that 
found only in full-fledged federal states”). 
7 See J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, in 
THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 201 
(J.H.H. Weiler, ed., 2000).  Though Weiler is concerned here with showing a convergence of EU 
and WTO substantive law, he both notes the apparent convergence toward rule of law that 
increased WTO judicialization represents, id. at 201-202, and also warns against the “simplistic 
dream of ‘constitutionalizing’ the GATT . . . [and] using the EU as a ’model’ for the WTO . . . .”  
See also Daniel K. Tarullo, Book Review, The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional 
Issues by Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds.), in 202 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 941, 942 (joining 
Weiler in deprecating simplistic comparisons of the EU and WTO and doubting the wisdom of 
calls for WTO direct effect).   
8 Pub.L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
9 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (a)(1).  
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provision thought to have self-executing force, that force would immediately be overridden by 
the later-in-date URAA.  Thus, no WTO provision can operate to change prior or subsequent 
U.S. law.   
 
To drive the point home the URAA provides in section 102(c) that: 
 
 “No person other than the United States (A) shall have any cause of action or 
defense under any of the [WTO] Agreements . . . or (B) may challenge, in any 
action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any 
department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States . . . .”10 
 
Thus, no private or other person, other than the United States, has standing within a U.S. court to 
invoke a provision of a WTO agreement to challenge actions of the federal government or its 
agencies.  
 
Turning to the effect of the WTO agreements on State law, we confront a slightly more 
complex situation.  Recall that the URAA does not say that the WTO agreements are to have no 
effect whatsoever within the U.S. legal system.  Rather it says that existing (and subsequent) 
federal law prevails over WTO law.  The established understanding is that because of federal law 
supremacy, State law may not interfere with U.S. obligations deriving from international 
agreements.  Thus, during the pre-WTO era even without much discussion of whether the 1947 
GATT was or was not self-executing, a few decisions of state and federal courts struck down 
State law that clashed with the GATT.11   
 
The URAA deals with the issue of State law by according to the federal government a 
complete monopoly on the right to bring an action against (or to raise any defense against the 
applicability of) any State law claimed to be inconsistent with a WTO provision.12  Thus, 
although the WTO agreements would prevail over inconsistent State law, this outcome can only 
be established if the federal government itself chooses to seek a judicial order to that effect.13  
Thus, a political decision must be taken at the federal level before a State law inconsistent with a 
WTO agreement can be struck down.  
                                                 
10 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1). 
11 See Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United 
States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 556, 562-569 (1997). Brand notes one 
case where the court applied WTO law without considering its legal status in the United States.  
See, e.g.,United States v. Star Indus., 462 F.2d 557 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Territory of Hawaii v. 
Hawaii, 41 Haw. 565 (1957). 
12   19 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(1). 
 
13  19 U.S.C. § 3512 (b)(2)(A) (“ No State law… may be declared… except in an 





The upshot then is that within the U.S. legal system private parties are completely barred 
from seeking to give direct effect to WTO provisions in court proceedings, whether the challenge 
is to federal or State law.  Thus the URAA even nullifies the few cases in the pre-WTO era that 
had allowed private enforcement of GATT law against the States. 
 
 
B. Indirect Effect 
 
1.  In general 
 
If WTO law cannot be given direct effect in U.S. law, can it be given indirect effect?  
Should it operate as a controlling source for interpreting ambiguous federal statutes?  If the 
answer is yes, then depending on the degree of interpretive deference applied, the WTO could 
play a potentially large role within U.S. courts. 
 
Of course, the potential significance of indirect effect should not be overstated.  An 
unambiguous federal statute must be applied by U.S. courts even if doing so violates WTO law.  
For example, in the well-known GATT Superfund Case,14 the U.S. statute in question imposed a 
higher tax on imported than on domestic crude oil.  This was a blatant violation of the non-
discrimination rule of GATT Article III(2), but the statute was unambiguous.   No amount of 
indirect effect could have given force to WTO rules.   Similarly the provisions of Section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 did not allow for any significant interpretive maneuvering.   That section  
provided for an additional border-enforced intellectual property rights regime for imports.  No 
amount of interpretive legerdemain could have brought the statute into conformity with the 
GATT panel ruling that Section 337 violated the GATT Article III(4) non-discrimination 
principle.15  
 
Still, indirect effect is not a trivial doctrine.  Anyone familiar with European Community 
law will immediately recognize the parallel between indirect effect and the Marleasing16 doctrine 
and will acknowledge the latter’s importance.  The ECJ decided Marleasing against a 
background of recalcitrance on the part of Member States in implementing EC directives.  In 
previous decisions the ECJ had held that directives could be given vertical direct effect on behalf 
                                                 
14 United StatesTaxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, June 17, 
1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988).   
15 See United States--Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989).  
16  Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion S.A., 1990 




of a private party claiming against the non- implementing Member State itself.  Vertical 
direct effect prevented a Member State from relying on its own wrong-doing (failure to 
implement the directive) to defeat a private party’s claim.  Thus, for example, a Member State 
could not prosecute a private party for violating a national statute that the Member State should 
have revoked in compliance with an EC directive.  That unclean-hands logic, however, did not 
apply to horizontal direct effect, allowing one private party to invoke a directive in a dispute 
with another private party.  
 
Previously, the ECJ held explicitly that directives could not have horizontal direct effect. 
Nevertheless, in Marleasing, the ECJ ruled that directives have indirect effect and articulated the 
concept in such strong terms that it seemed the rough equivalent of de facto horizontal direct 
effect.   The ECJ required Spanish courts to change their previous interpretation of the Spanish 
Civil Code to conform to an EC directive.17 The new (compelled) interpretation effectively 
imposed new obligations on private parties—the essence of horizontal direct effect.   However, 
in a later case, Faccini Dori,18 the ECJ backed away from Marleasing’s strong version of  
indirect effect by requiring  national courts to interpret national law only “as far as possible” to 
be consistent with EC directives. In other words, the ECJ would not force national judges to 
make a mockery of “interpretation” in order to bring national law into conformity. In sum, 
despite the latent force and importance of indirect effect, it has implicit limits.  
 
In the United States international agreements are given indirect effect19 based on the 
Charming Betsy canon of interpretation of federal statutes first articulated in the early Supreme 
Court case, Murray v. The Charming Betsy.20  Chief Justice Marshall declared that Aan Act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains. . . .@21  Because the Alaw of nations@ includes international agreements as 
                                                 
17 The ECJ based its reasoning on Article 10  of the EC Treaty: AMember States 
shall take all appropriate measures . . . to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty or resulting from the action taken by the institutions of the Community.@  It held that 
courts are included in the concept of AMember State@ and hence have an obligation to exercise 
their interpretive function consistent with Community law. Marleasing, supra note 16, at para. 8 
(“Member States’ obligation arising from a directive… is binding on all the authorities of 
Member States including… the courts.”) 
18 Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl.,  1994 ECR I-3325, at para. 4. 
19 See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 114 (1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to 
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States.”)  
20 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).  The Court cited Charming Betsy with approval most 
recently in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004) . 
21 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).   
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well as customary law, the WTO agreements in principle fall within the scope of the Charming 
Betsy canon.  Nevertheless, in the WTO context there are a number of reasons why the Charming 
Betsy doctrine is likely to be muted.  Before turning to why this is so, I trace in the following 
section how U.S. courts have actually treated the Charming Betsy doctrine in the context of 
WTO obligations.   
 
 
2. Regulatory Protection and Indirect Effect 
 
The indirect effect doctrine has surfaced most prominently in the United States in 
connection with trade remedy law, that is, antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards (or 
escape clause) law.22  Outside this area, few litigated cases deal at all with GATT or WTO 
indirect effect, and with one exception, those that do so generally accord little, if any, 
consideration of the Charming Betsy doctrine.23  
                                                 
22 The cases discussed below deal only with antidumping and countervailing duty 
law, but the URAA’s constraints on indirect effect discussed in a later section include actions by 
the ITC under the safeguards law.     
23 The one exception known to the author is Caterpillar, Inc. v. U.S., 941 F. Supp. 
1241 (CIT, 1996), though Caterpillar seems more sui generis than a telling decision.  It 
concerned a customs valuation dispute in which the Customs Service sought to include in the 
dutiable value of imported merchandise an amount for value added taxes ultimately refunded by 
the foreign government.  The GATT law requiring exclusion of such rebated taxes was quite 
clear, as was the United States government’s intent, after multilateral negotiations, to accept this 
position.  The case conveys the impression that the Customs Service made a bureaucratic 
decision without real deliberation over GATT requirements.  The language of the Court of 
International Trade could be read as holding that the Charming Betsy doctrine supercedes 
Chevron and controls the outcome.  I believe a more penetrating reading suggests that the case 
should be seen as unique and not pathbreaking.  The court understood that the GATT rule was 
absolutely clear and that there was every intent on the part of Congress and the Executive Branch 
to conform to that GATT rule, even though the statute, as written, did not make that point clear.  
Against this background, the Customs Service, it seems without much reflection or evaluation, 
simply took a poorly analyzed, bureaucratic position inconsistent with good sense and the GATT 
rule.  That assessment of the case is supported by its ultimate resolution.  After the case was 
appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, both parties agreed that it should be dismissed. 
The Federal Circuit followed their wishes by dismissing without an opinion. See 111 F.3d 143 
(Table), 1997 WL 168479 (Fed. Cir.), Unpublished Disposition.  
In other non-trade-remedy cases, the indirect-effect rule of Charming Betsy played no 
real role because the courts found the relevant federal statute clear and controlling.  See Turtle 
Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recounting the long 
history of the State Department’s effort to conform  to the requirements of the Appellate Body 
decision in the famous Shrimp/Turtle case, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)).  In its final resolution of the dispute the 




Trade remedy law invites controversy over indirect effect for several reasons.  First, these 
regimes afford import-competing interests significant defense against foreign competition.  
Second, the relevant statutes are quite technical and hence present opportunities for 
administrative discretion in their application.  Finally, the thrust of successive multilateral GATT 
and WTO negotiations, running from the 1967 Kennedy Round Antidumping Code to current 
WTO agreements on antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguards, has been to constrain 
administrative abuse of these proceedings.24   
 
This sets up a classic dynamic.  Import competing interests press for trade-restrictive 
applications of trade remedy law.  Foreign exporters push back by pressing their governments to 
challenge in the WTO system what they regard as excessive trade-remedy protectionism.  And in 
deciding these cases WTO panels and the Appellate Body have a tendency to give a liberal trade 
reading to the WTO agreements.25   Importers have then urged these decisions on U.S. agencies 
and courts, through the indirect effect doctrine, to curtail trade remedy protectionism.  Though 
this line of argument may have leverage with the Executive Branch, the courts have not been 
receptive whenever the Executive turns a deaf ear—as the discussion below demonstrates. .    
 
a) Case Law (Charming Betsy vs. Chevron) 
 
The issue before U.S. courts in these cases can be restated as a contest between the 
Charming Betsy doctrine, which privileges international agreements, and a second canon of 
                                                                                                                                                             
interpretation that the statute prohibited such an approach). 
24 See generally,  John J. Barceló, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to TradeBThe 
United States and the International Antidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1972);  John J. 
Barceló, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy LawBConfusion of Purposes, 14 THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 311 (1991) 
25 See DanielTarullo, The Hidden Costs of Internatioinal Dispute Settlement: WTO 
Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 109, 118 (2002) (noting 
that WTO panel and Appellate Body rulings often find “a single, unambiguous meaning for 
provisions of the Agreement that seem readily susceptible to multiple readings.”) Tarullo argues 
that the WTO rulings have chosen outcomes that improperly curtail the import-blocking use of 
domestic trade-remedy law.   
The “zeroing” controversy in anti-dumping law illustrates the liberal trade tendency of 
WTO rulings while also showing that those rulings can sometimes cut the other way.  See infra 
fn 107.  See also, Alan Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel 
Dispute, 7 J. Intl Econ. L. 523 (2004) (noting that WTO rulings in safeguard cases have made it 
very difficult if not impossible for a country to meet the requirements for a safeguard remedy set 
out in those rulings.)  
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interpretation deriving from the famous Chevron case,26 which privileges agency 
discretion.  In Chevron the Supreme Court held that courts reviewing an agency’s interpretation 
of an ambiguous statute should defer to the agency’s view, as long as it is reasonable--no matter 
how the court on its own would interpret the statute.  Chevron divides the review process into 
two stages.  At the first stage, a reviewing court must decide whether the statute speaks so clearly 
that there is only one acceptable interpretation.  If so, then that interpretation must prevail, and 
contrary agency action must be struck down.  But if the statute is ambiguous, we move to stage 
two.  Here the court must accept any agency interpretation that is reasonable.  Why?  Because 
this reflects Congress’s intent in delegating power to the agency to administer the statute.   
 
In the trade remedy area the Charming Betsy and Chevron doctrines can come into 
conflict whenever the agency’s interpretation of a statute is arguably inconsistent with a WTO 
obligation. Where Charming Betsy and Chevron point in the same direction, the courts face no 
dilemma.  This was the case in Federal-Mogul Corporation v. Unites States,27 where the 
Department of Commerce had consistently taken a tax-neutral approach to tax adjustments in 
antidumping proceedings.  Commerce had done so in part it seems because it wanted to conform 
to GATT requirements.28  The plaintiffs nevertheless argued that the antidumping statute 
required non-tax-neutral adjustments that would have led to higher antidumping duties.   In 
siding with Commerce, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals read the GATT and WTO 
antidumping codes as requiring tax neutrality and strongly affirmed the Charming Betsy 
doctrine: AGATT agreements are international obligations, and absent express Congressional 
language to the contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with international 
obligations.@29  But this was an easy case, because Chevron required the same result--deference 
to a reasonable agency interpretation.30   
 
The more important question is what courts will do when Charming Betsy and Chevron 
point in opposite directions—thus truly putting the indirect effect doctrine to the test.  Under the 
most common form of analysis the Charming Betsy issue arises at Chevron’s second stage.  
                                                 
26 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).   
27 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
28  63 F.3d 1572, at 1582 (“Commerce's understanding of its duty under… 
international agreements… lends support to the position it has taken”). 
 
29 63 F.3d 1572,  at 1581.   
30 See also George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998) in which 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an EPA rule allowing foreign refiners to petition the 
EPA to establish an individual baseline for gasoline purity.  The EPA promulgated the rule in 
part to conform U.S. law to a WTO panel ruling that the prior EPA practice discriminated against 
imports.  Thus, here again Chevron and Charming Betsy pointed in the same direction, and the 
Federal Circuit refused to interpret the relevant statute to prohibit the EPA’s action. 
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Consider, for example, an ambiguous trade remedy statute subject to two reasonable 
interpretations, A and B.  Commerce chooses A, but WTO law would require  B.  Will a court 
apply Charming Betsy to force interpretation B on Commerce, or will it uphold Commerce’s 
choice of interpretation A, as required by Chevron?   In general the answer seems to be that 
Chevron trumps Charming Betsy.  Commerce will prevail.   
 
Timken Co. v. U. S.31 closely tracks the hypothetical just stated.   It concerns the 
controversial practice of Azeroing@ in calculating a weighted average dumping margin.  Suppose 
there are two home market sales at 10 each and two sales to the United States, one at 15 and one 
at 5.  How is a weighted average dumping margin to be calculated?  Article 2.4.2 of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement provides:   
 
A. . . the existence of margins of dumping . . . shall normally be established on the basis of 
a comparison of a weighted average normal value [the home price] with a weighted 
average of prices of all comparable export transactions . . .@ 
 
Under the Article 2.4.2 approach, the average home price in the above example would be 10, as 
would the average export price.  There would be a zero dumping margin.  Commerce generally 
applies the average to average approach in deciding whether there is a dumping margin in the 
initial investigation.32   It follows a different methodology, however, for annual administrative 
reviews.33  
 
For annual reviews used to keep the duty-determining dumping margin current-- the U.S. 
antidumping statute requires Commerce to calculate (i) the normal value [home price] and export 
price . . . of each entry of the subject merchandise, and (ii) the dumping margin for each such 
entry.@34  The statute also defines Adumping margin@ as Athe amount by which the normal value 
[home price] exceeds the export price . . .@35  On the basis of this statutory language Commerce 
computes a dumping margin for each entry (generally by comparing the export price to an 
average home price).36   If the export price is above the home price, Commerce treats this entry 
as occurring at a Azero@ dumping margin.  Where export price is below home price, Commerce 
calculates the difference as a positive dumping margin.  It then totals all the positive dumping 
margins and divides by the total value of all export sales from the individual manufacturer under 
investigation to achieve a weighted average dumping margin for that manufacturer.  This is the 
                                                 
31 354 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
32 19 C.F.R. ' 351.414(c)(1) (current through March 23, 2005).  
33 See 19 C.F.R. ' 351.414(c)(2) (current through June 16, 2004).  
34 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675 (a)(2)(A)(emphasis added). 
35 19 USC 1677 (35)(A)(emphasis added). 
36 See 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(d)(1) (current through March 23, 2005).  
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percentage antidumping duty to be collected on each entry of the subject goods from that 
manufacturer.  Under this methodology in our example the weighted average dumping margin 
would be 25%  (the sum of positive dumping margins (5) divided by the total  value of all 
imports of the subject merchandise (20)).   
 
In Timken the Federal Circuit found Commerce’s approach entirely reasonable in light of 
the statutory language.37  It noted that Commerce calculated a dumping margin for each entry in 
accord with the statute (implying that using an average value for export sales would have been 
harder or impossible to square with the Aeach entry@ statutory provision38).    The court also noted 
that the statutory definition of a dumping margin (the amount by which the home price exceeds 
the export price) could reasonably be interpreted to refer only to positive numbers, not to 
negative ones.  Thus, Azeroing@ was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and Chevron 
required the court to accept it.  
 
The Charming Betsy doctrine pointed in the opposite direction, however, because of the 
Appellate Body’s decision in Bed Linen,39 a dispute between India and the European Community 
over Azeroing.@  In Bed Linen the Appellate Body interpreted Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement together with Article 2.4 (calling for a Afair comparison@ of home price and export 
price) to prohibit zeroing.  In making its initial antidumping determination in Bed Linen, the 
Community used a multiple averaging technique--averaging home prices and export prices for 
different categories of the subject merchandise.  All of the sub-categories, taken together, 
constituted the subject merchandise, bed linen.  The Community used this device because it 
claimed the goods were more comparable within each sub-category than across categories.  To 
include all products within a single category-- in other words, refusing to sub-categorize--would 
have required complicated price adjustments to account for product differences.  When it came 
to aggregating the dumping margins for the different categories, however, the Community used 
the zeroing technique.  Only positive dumping margins were included in the sum of dumping 
margins.  The Appellate Body found this practice violated Articles 2.4 and 2.4.2, in effect 
holding that the sum of dumping margins used in calculating a weighted average dumping 
margin should have included negative values whenever for a given sub-category the average 
export price was above the average home price.40    
                                                 
37  354 F.3d 1334, 1342 (concluding “Commerce based its zeroing practice on a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute”). 
 
38 This implication is stronger in the lower court’s opinion.  See Timken Co. v. U.S., 
240 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1243 (CIT, 2002).  
39 WTO Appellate Body, European CommunitiesBAntidumping Duties on Imports 
of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001).  
40  For a detailed account of this case and the attendant WTO decisions, see Daniel 
K, Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping 





The importer in Timken argued that in view of the Bed Linen ruling Charming Betsy 
required Commerce to abandon zeroing.  The Federal Circuit, however, gave short shrift to this 
argument.  The court concluded that it was bound by Chevron to accept Commerce’s reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.  It distinguished Bed Linen on technical grounds--namely (i) that the 
United States was not a party and therefore was not technically bound by the decision and (ii) 
that Bed Linen involved an initial antidumping decision, whereas Timken involved an 
administrative review.41  The court also claimed that Bed Linen was not sufficiently persuasive,42 
but without offering any real explanation of that conclusion or itself explaining what better 
interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement would have supported a zeroing practice.43 In 
short, when confronted with a Chevron-Charming Betsy clash, the Federal Circuit sided with 
Chevron.44 
                                                 
41   354 F.3d 1334, 1339. 
 
42    354 F.3d 1334, 1344. 
 
43 For such an interpretation supporting zeroing see the dissenting opinion in the 
panel decision involving softwood lumber from Canada. WTO Panel, United States—Final 
Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/R (April 13, 2004). 
44 In a different case the Court of International Trade also upheld Commerce’s 
Azeroing@ method, dismissing a Charming Betsy challenge based on the Appellate Body’s Bed 
Linen decision.  PAM S.p.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 265 F.Supp. 2d 1362 (Ct. Int’l Trade, 
2003).  Here at least the court did not simply refuse to apply stare decisis to  Bed Linen, a point 
that it made and about which it is correct, but went on cursorily to interpret the Antidumping 
Agreement as not prohibit zeroing. Id. at 1373. 
Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (Ct. Int’l Trade, 
1999), is another case in which the Court of International Trade refused to apply Charming Betsy 
to force Commerce to conform to a WTO panel ruling.  The case concerned what finding was 
necessary for Commerce to continue to enforce an existing antidumping duty order.   The panel 
found Commerce’s “not likely” test (i.e., the duty would be tereminated if it were  “not likely” 
that dumping would continue) to be inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the Antidumping 
Agreement, which requires authorities to determine whether dumping is “likely to continue or 
recur if the duty were removed . . . .” After claiming that “Chevron must be applied in concert 
with the Charming Betsy doctrine . . .,” the CIT rejected  the WTO panel’s interpretation of the 
Antidumping Agreement.  Id. at 1344. Instead, the court interpreted the agreement itself, finding 
Commerce’s “not likely” test acceptable.  The only difference between Commerce’s test and the 
panel’s was the theoretically possible situation of a 50-50 split in the dumping continuance 
probability (dumping continuance would not be “not likely” but at the same time it would also 
not be “likely”), in which case Commerce would continue the duty but the panel would 
seemingly have required discontinuance.  The court, clearly reluctant to give real force to the 
Charming Betsy, said: “ . . . unless the conflict between an international obligation and 
Commerce’s interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear, a court should take special care 




The recent Allegheny Ludlum45 decision is the closest the Federal Circuit has come to 
giving force to the Charming Betsy doctrine in a trade remedy dispute.  The Allegheny Ludlum 
court ruled that Commerce’s “same person” approach to deciding the continued 
countervailability of a pre-privatization government subsidy was not allowed by the 
countervailing duty statute.  In doing so, it cited the Charming Betsy as supporting this outcome 
and treated the Appellate Body ruling against the “same person” methodology as effectively 
defining the international law obligations of the United States.  But the case is unique in a way 
that undercuts its importance.  At the time of the Allegheny Ludlum decision Commerce had 
actually already decided to abandon the Asame person@ approach in deference to the Appellate 
Body decision46--though the change operated only prospectively.  Thus the court was not truly 
forcing on Commerce a WTO-required interpretation that Commerce rejected.   Moreover, the 
Allegheny Ludlum court emphasized that its decision was based primarily upon its independent 
interpretation of the countervailing duty statute and that Charming Betsy was only a subsidiary 
consideration (a “guide”).47    
 
The most forceful reliance on the Charming Betsy doctrine in a trade remedy dispute has 
come recently from not a court, but rather a NAFTA binational panel decision in Softwood 
Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Antidumping Determination.48 Again the dispute 
concerned the zeroing methodology in a U.S. antidumping proceeding.  The binational panel 
rendered its decision after (1) the WTO Appellate Body in the same case had ruled that zeroing 
was inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement49 and also after (2) the United States (acting 
through the U.S. Trade Representative) had decided to accept that decision and to eliminate 
zeroing in all future antidumping proceedings.50  As a matter of specific statutory authority, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1345.    
45 Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. U. S., 367F.3d 1339;(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
46  367 F.3d 1339, 1342-1343 (“Commerce changed its position because the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) issued an appellate report stating that the same-person methodology 
violates § 123 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA). See United States—
Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European Communities, 
WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002).”)  
 
47   367 F.3d 1339, 1348.  
 
48  In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final 
Affirmative Antidumping Determination (NAFTA Article 1904 Binational Panel Review; USA-
CDA-2002-1904-02) (June 9, 2005), available online at www.nafta-sec-alena.org.  
 
49  United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004).   
 
50  International Trade Administration Notice of Determination Under Section 129 of 
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URAA had authorized the Trade Representative to implement an adverse WTO ruling only 
prospectively.  The remaining issue was whether zeroing was unlawful in the case at hand--
which had of course arisen when zeroing was still in effect--on the theory that Commerce’s 
zeroing methodology clashed with the Antidumping Agreement and hence was disallowed by 
Charming Betsy.      
 
The binational panel, applying its interpretation of U.S. law, gave an affirmative answer.  
It reasoned that Charming Betsy was alive and well in U.S. law and that it came into play at the 
second stage of the Chevron analysis.  In other words, Chevron and Charming Betsy were not 
strictly in conflict.   Given that the statute was ambiguous, Chevron operated to filter out all 
unreasonable interpretations of it.  Charming Betsy then functioned to disallow any otherwise 
“reasonable” interpretation that was nevertheless inconsistent with U.S. international law 
obligations.  Read closely, it is clear that the panel’s decision found the international law 
obligation to derive from the Antidumping Agreement itself, and not from the Appellate Body 
ruling—a distinction that bears on the controversial issue (discussed below) of whether dispute 
settlement rulings (as opposed to the WTO agreements themselves) carry an international law 
obligation to conform national law.  Again, however, the force of Charming Betsy seems muted.   
It operated only after the United States had formally accepted the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement.  Thus, as in Allegheny Ludlum, Charming Betsy 
did not truly force a result on a reluctant Executive Branch.  
 
b) A Theory of Muted Indirect Effect   
 
The upshot of the case law then is that only a muted Charming Betsy doctrine applies for 
WTO law where agency action is involved.  There are at least three arguments that support this 
result, deriving respectively from: (i) the traditional deference courts give to the Executive 
Branch in foreign affairs; 51 (ii) the specific provisions of the URAA; and (iii) the failure of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Agreement to impose an unambiguous obligation on members to 
conform their law to panel or Appellate Body rulings.  
  
i)   The Executive’s Role in Foreign Affairs 
 
In discussions of separation of powers it is almost axiomatic that courts defer to the two 
political branches in the sensitive, politically charged field of foreign affairs.  Typically, the 
Executive Branch has primacy in most aspects of foreign policy.52  In particular the courts give 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act: Antidumping Measures on Certain Softwood Lumber 
Products From Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 22636 (May 2, 2005).  
51 See, e.g., Hyundai Co., Ltd. v. U. S., 53 F. Supp.2d at 1343 (CIT, 1999) (AThe 
courts traditionally refrain from disturbing the >very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
[executive] as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of foreign relations.’@ 
(quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936))) 
52 See generally, Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of 
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479 (1998); Curtis 
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“great weight” to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of international agreements.53  In 
trade remedy decisions this translates into the pattern we have seen of courts subordinating 
Charming Betsy to Chevron.54 
 
This is not to say that judicial review in trade remedy cases is meaningless.  Rather, it is 
difficult to persuade a court to override an executive agency’s interpretive policy by adopting its 
own or the WTO’s interpretation of a WTO agreement.  In fact, no case seems to have done so. 
 
In a published article Judge Restani of the Court of International Trade has even 
suggested that if the court is unsure whether an agency has truly given careful consideration to 
the United States’ international law obligations, then it should remand the case to the agency 
with appropriate instructions.55  But she concludes: “The court probably should avoid importing 




The Force of WTO Agreements.  The specific provisions in the URAA seem even more 
important as justification for muting Charming Betsy in trade remedy cases.  Given that 
Charming Betsy is only a canon of construction for interpreting federal statutes, Congress clearly 
has the power to override it and seems to have done so in the URAA. Two provisions are 
particularly relevant: Section 102(c)57 (quoted immediately below) and Section 123(g)58 
(describing the mechanisms to handle agency compliance with WTO dispute settlement rulings; 
also quoted in part, further below).  
 
URAA section 102(c)(1) provides: 
 
No person other than the United States 
 
(A) shall have a cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round Agreements 
                                                                                                                                                             
A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev. 649 (2000). 
53 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, §326 
(2) (1987) and the cases cited in the Comments thereto.   
54 See in particular the Hyundai case cited above in fn 51. 
55  Jane A. Restani & Ira Bloom, Interpreting International Trade Statutes: Is the 
Charming Betsy Sinking? 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1533, 1544 (2001). 
 
56 Restani & Bloom,24 Fordham Int’l L.J. at 1543 .   
57 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c) (2000). 
58 19 U.S.C.  § 3533(g) (2000).  
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or by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement, or 
 
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or 
inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any 
State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is 
inconsistent with such agreement.59 
 
Certainly subsection (B) above could be read as barring all indirect effect for WTO 
agreements.  The Statement of Administrative Action, which Congress endorsed as an 
authoritative interpretation of the URAA,60 seems to support that conclusion.  The SAA says of 
section 102(c): 
 
The provision also precludes a private right of action attempting to require, preclude, or 
modify federal or state action on grounds such as an allegation that the government is 
required to exercise discretionary authority or general ‘public interest’ authority under 
other provisions of law in conformity with the Uruguay Round agreements.61 
 
This statement surely undercuts the Charming Betsy doctrine; Commerce, for example, does not 
have to exercise its “discretionary authority” to interpret the antidumping statute in line with the 
Antidumping Agreement.  The SAA goes on to clarify that the Executive Branch does not 
interpret 102(c) to bar arguments to the agencies themselves urging that they conform their 
actions to WTO requirements.62  What seems intended is that courts not order agencies to reach 
this result in the exercise of agency discretion.   
 
Despite the plausibility of this reading of the URAA and the SAA, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Timken gave a narrower construction to Section 102(c).63  In Timken the 
                                                 
59 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1) (2000). 
60 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (d). 
61 H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 676 (1994) (emphasis added).   
62 The SAA includes the following statement: “The prohibition of a private right of 
action based on the Uruguay Round agreements . . . does not preclude any agency of government 
from considering, or entertaining argument on, whether its action or proposed action is consistent 
with the Uruguay Round agreements although any change in agency action would have to be 
authorized by domestic law.” H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 676 (1994). The last point concerning 
domestic law authority presumably means that the relevant statutory provision must be 
ambiguous and that an agency interpretation of such an ambiguous provision to conform to the 
requirements of a WTO agreement must be at least a reasonable interpretation of the statutory 
provision.   




government argued that 102(c) completely precluded all Charming Betsy claims.  The 
Timken court disagreed and found in effect that 102(c) barred only claims based directly on 
WTO law as a rule of decision. 64  Thus, in principle the Charming Betsy indirect effect doctrine 
survived.  In the end , however, as we have seen, the Timken court gave decisive force to 
Chevron deference and treated Charming Betsy as a relatively unimportant after thought.  Thus it 
let stand an agency interpretation seemingly at odds with the WTO and reached the result, at 
least, that the government urged. 
 
As long as the Timken construction of 102(c) holds,65 litigants may still try to persuade a 
court to employ Charming Betsy to override an agency’s statutory interpretation, particularly if it 
contravenes a WTO agreement.  Nevertheless, as we have seen, no litigant has yet succeeded.66  
 
The Force of WTO Panel and Appellate Body Decisions.   URAA Section 123 (g) is 
arguably even clearer in rejecting any “adjudicatory” force within the U.S. legal system for WTO 
panel and Appellate Body rulings.  
 
Section 123(g)(1) provides: 
 
In any case in which a dispute settlement panel or the Appellate Body finds in its report 
that a regulation or practice of a department or agency of the United States is inconsistent 
with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, that regulation or practice may not be 
amended, rescinded, or otherwise modified in the implementation of such report unless 
and until . . . [there follows a list of requirements including, among others, consultation 
with Congressional committees, non-federal government officials and private sector 
representatives respecting whether and, if so, in what manner to implement the 
decision.]67  
 
The statute plainly contemplates a political process in which the Executive Branch 
decides whether to implement WTO rulings based on consultations with the relevant 
                                                 
64  354 F.3d at 1341. 
 
65  In a more recent decision, again involving “zeroing”, Corus Staal BV v. 
Department of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (C.A. Fed. 2005), the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld Timken and emphasized that Congress provided for a political process to decide whether 
to conform U.S. law to a WTO ruling.  Although the Corus court did not rely on section 102(c), 
its reasoning seems indistinguishable from a holding that would have done so to bar a litigant 
from even raising an indirect effect argument.  
 
66  Of course a litigant did succeed not in a court, but in the limited circumstances of 
the NAFTA binational panel Softwood Lumber decision.  See supra fn 48 and accompanying 
text.  
 
67 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2000).   
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Congressional committees and private sector interest groups.  Implementation in any 
particular case could require new legislation or simply a change in agency interpretation of 
existing law.  Any change in agency interpretation would have to be prospective, unless the 
President specifically determines that an earlier implementation date is in the national interest.68  
In the case of trade remedy law, specifically antidumping and countervailing duty law, a change 
can only be prospective.69 
 
Plainly these procedural requirements have substantive implications, namely that a court 
may not order an agency to adjust its interpretation of an ambiguous statute to conform to a 
WTO ruling.  How could a court issue such an order in the face of an explicit statutory 
instruction prohibiting an agency from making such a change until a specific political process 
has been invoked?  Moreover, in the case of antidumping and countervailing duty law, the 
URAA spells out the need for the Trade Representative’s written request for change70--an action 
implicitly predicated upon a politically motivated exercise of discretion. 
 
Certainly if this is so for a WTO dispute settlement ruling specifically addressing a U.S. 
agency practice, a fortiori, the URAA would seem to disallow giving adjudicatory force to a 
WTO dispute settlement ruling not involving the United States as a respondent  Moreover, WTO 
dispute settlement rulings do not have strict stare decisis effect.71  About the most one could 
argue for, I believe, is that a court could look to the reasoning and analysis of WTO panel and 
Appellate Body rulings to inform its own interpretation of a WTO agreement, if that were 
relevant, or of corresponding language in a federal statute.  
 
 
iii) Absence of an Unambiguous Obligation to Implement WTO Rulings  
 
                                                 
68 19 USC § 3533(g)(2) (2000). 
69 19 USC § 3538 (b) and (c).  19 USC  § 3538 (a) also sets out a special procedure 
when an ITC determination is involved, presumably because of its status as an independent 
regulatory agency.  First, if the Trade Representative so requests, the ITC must decide whether it 
has the statutory authority to conform its decision to the WTO panel or Appellate Body findings.  
If it decides that it does, and the Trade Representative further so requests, the ITC must bring its 
action into line with the WTO findings.  Before making any such request for ITC compliance, 
however, the Trade Representative must consult with the congressional committees. 19 U.S.C. § 
1338(a)(3) and (4).  Again, a political decision is plainly contemplated. 
70  19 USC § 3538 (b)(2).  
 
71 See DSU art. 3(2); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 265 (4th ed. 2002) (“While strict notions of ‘stare 
decisis’ do not apply in the WTO, it is clear that prior cases do play an important role in dispute 
settlement….”).   
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Finally, and most tellingly, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is 
extraordinarily ambiguous concerning whether a member has an international law obligation to 
bring its law into conformity with an adverse WTO ruling.  Certainly, if there is no such 
conformity obligation, it would be strange indeed for a domestic court to rely on such a ruling to 
control agency interpretation of a U.S. statute. John Jackson has noted, that whether an 
agreement contains a conformity obligation is critical for legal systems that would give direct 
effect to international agreements.72  It is also central to the question of indirect effect.  If a 
member state has no international law obligation to conform its law to WTO rulings, why should 
that member’s courts require agencies to interpret ambiguous domestic statutes to conform to 
such rulings? 
 
On the question whether the DSU contains a conformity obligation, one can find 
thorough, insightful, and persuasive legal writing arguing both sides.73  Without rehearsing all 
the arguments, I am personally inclined to the negative view (absence of a “hard law”conformity 
obligation) for several reasons.   
 
One of the strongest arguments for the conformity obligation lies in the explicit DSU 
provision holding that there is no such obligation in a non-violation case.74  While one might 
                                                 
72 See John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 Amer. J. Int’l L. 109, 117 (2004).   
73 The legal literature contains an unusually thorough debate on whether member states 
must change domestic law to conform toWTO dispute settlement rulings.  For arguments that 
international law requires members to conform local law to those rulings, see, e.g., John H. 
Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or 
Option to ‘Buy Out’?, 98 AMER. J. INTL L. 109, 117 (2004); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More 
Power to the WTO?, 2001 J. INTL ECON. L. 41, 60-61 (2001); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute 
Settlement UnderstandingBMisunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AMER. J. 
INTL L. 60, 62-3 (1997).  
For the opposite view, see, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic 
Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 179, 189 (2002) (“The system thus allows violations to persist as long as the violator is 
willing to pay that price.”); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? in Marco 
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick, NEW DIRECTION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUS OF JOHN H. JACKSON, 347, 357 (2000) (“The suggestion that this non-compliance option 
[i.e., with WTO rulings] is ‘illegal,’ in my view, is at odds with both the legal structure and the 
economic logic of the dispute settlement process.”); Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90 AMER. J. INT’L L. 416 (1996). 
 
74 See DSU, art 26(1)(b) “[W]here a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits 
under, or impede the attainment of objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without 




expect the converse to be true, i.e., that a conformity obligation emerges in a violation 
case, the DSU nowhere states such a straightforward, “hard law” conclusion.  Instead it seems 
studiously to avoid stating it. Assuming this omission was deliberate, as I think we should, what 
follows?  Should we not then confine the implied converse conformity oligation to one that is at 
most hortatory, i.e., one intended to influence the exercise of political discretion but not one 
commanding “hard law” results.  
 
One can point to other support in the DSU for this hortatory interpretation.  After all, the 
DSU says that a member state is recommended, to bring its law into conformity, not ordered or 
required to do so.75  It is true that aternatives to full conformity, such as offering compensatory 
concessions or tolerating retaliation, are plainly stated to be “not preferred” and “temporary.”76  
Nevertheless, the DSU nowhere says when this state of temporariness must end.  Without such a 
“hard law” ending date for the permitted “temporary” measures, are we not left with a mere 
“hortatory” obligation to bring one’s law into conformity (at some indefinite point in the future).   
 
True, WTO Agreement Article XVI(4) says: AEach Member shall ensure the conformity 
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the 
annexed Agreements.@  But the Dispute Settlement Understanding is itself one of those Aannexed 
Agreements.@ Hence the question remains what those Aobligations@ are.  One can easily read the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding as imposing an “either-or” obligation.  Either a member state 
must bring its law into conformity, or if it does not, then it must provide satisfactory 
compensatory concessions or tolerate retaliatory action.  Perhaps it could be added that if a 
member state chooses not to bring its domestic law into conformity with the ruling, it faces a 
continuing Ahortatory@ obligation to end the temporariness of this Anot preferred@ state of affairs--
but it is not under a “hard law” legal obligation to do so.   
 
Again one can agree that panel and Appellate Body decisions are Abinding@ (in contrast to 
the previous GATT system) without at the same time equating Abinding@ with specific 
performance.  The result could be binding in the sense that a contract is Abinding,@ but does not 
necessarily have to be performed as long as the obligor is willing to pay damages.   A persuasive 
body of writing argues that WTO commitments are best understood as reciprocal and contingent 
                                                 
75  See DSU, art. 19(1) “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the 
measure into conformity with that agreement. . . .” (emphasis added).  
 
76  See DSU, art. 22(1) “. . . [N]either compensation nor the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into 
conformity with the covered agreements.”; DSU, art. 22(8) “The suspension of concessions or 
other obligations shall be temporary and shall be applied only until such time as the measure 
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must 
implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of 




and that notions of Aefficient breach@ infuse the understandings captured in the agreements77--
all the more so, in fact, if one reads the agreements in light of the understandings that prevailed 
under GATT.   
 
What do I mean by this last point?  GATT, the WTO’s predecessor institution, 
emphasized soft-law, political and diplomatic solutions to disputes, seeking to accommodate the 
realpolitic forces of member state internal politics.78  With this in mind, one could argue that the 
WTO should be presumed to have retained the political-diplomatic “ethos” of GATT, except 
where the new agreement spells out unambiguously that it is breaking with the past in this 
respect.  Thus, the very ambiguity of the DSU provisions seems to me to cut against the notion 
that there is now an international law obligation for a member state to conform its law to a WTO 
ruling—given that there never was such an obligation under the GATT.  For the purposes of 
indirect effect, the point might be put more forcefully.  Unless the agreement clearly demands 
that a member conform local law to a dispute settlement ruling, courts have no business inserting 
themselves into the political give-and-take to effect hard-law results where the political 
flexibility of soft-law was intended. 
 
In sum, U.S. courts give no direct effect and little, if any, indirect effect to WTO law 
within the U.S. legal system.  But this wall of separation between WTO law and the U.S. legal 
system is paradoxical. The next section draws on  political-economic and public choice theory to 
explain that paradox. 
 
III. The Lack of WTO Direct Effect--A Political-Economic (Public Choice) Explanation  
 
Wherein lies the paradox?  On one hand, political interest groups within the United 
States, presumably export-oriented industries and importers, had the organizational wherewithal, 
self-interest, and, most importantly, political clout to persuade Congress that a more 
“adjudicatory” and binding dispute settlement process was a top priority in negotiating the 
Uruguay Round agreements.  These interest groups were apparently dissatisfied with the 
GATT’s largely exhortatory dispute settlement system, under which a respondent could block 
the formation of a panel or simply reject its final decision.  The SAA in fact attributes the U.S. 
insistence on a more adjudicatory system to frustration within the country (particularly for 
                                                 
77  See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of 
Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 
(2002); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? in Marco Bronckers & Reinhard 
Quick, NEW DIRECTION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUS OF JOHN H. 
JACKSON, 347 (2000).   
  
78 Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure: An Overview of 
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (2000) (“[D]uring the first thirty years of 
GATT history, roughly 1948-1978, the GATT disputes procedure did exhibit a distinctly 
diplomatic character.”).  
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agricultual exporters) over successful GATT panel decisions that were not implemented.  In 
particular the SAA mentions cases against the European Community involving oilseeds, citrus, 
and pasta that led only to extended standoffs when the Community rejected GATT panel 
rulings.79  Presumably, export-oriented industries concluded that market access commitments 
from foreign governments were undercut by the absence of binding, adjudicatory enforcement 
procedures.  
 
On the other hand, as we have just seen, when the Congress approved the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, including the new, more adjudicatory, rules-oriented and binding dispute 
settlement system, it also insisted on an almost impenetrable barrier cordoning off the WTO 
from the domestic U.S. legal system: WTO agreements are given no direct effect; private parties 
in domestic litigation may not base claims or defenses on the WTO agreements; and even 
indirect effect is severely circumscribed and subordinated to political processes.  
 
Though no one would have expected the United States to adopt direct effect unilaterally, 
certainly mutual direct effect could have been a valuable negotiating objective.  If export-
oriented private interests wanted meaningful rules, subject to adjudicatory enforcement, why did 
they not seek a regime of mutually agreed and implemented direct effect, whereby private 
beneficiaries of market-opening commitments can discipline breaches through rule-of-law 
procedures in local courts?  Why did they settle instead for a toughened adjudicatory process at 
the WTO level alone that still provides no assurance the result will be honored?  The discussion 
below offers three explanations: (i) dispersed exporter support for a direct effect regime; (ii) 
strong and focused import-competing opposition to any such regime; and (iii) elected-official 
preference for a flexible regime inclined more toward managed than unqualified liberal trade.   
 
Turning first to exporters, they presumably share a generalized interest in giving direct 
effect to WTO agreements.  Such a regime would encourage countries to honor their market 
opening commitments.  At the same time, however, no individual exporter, or small group of 
exporters, has a particularized interest in this result.  In other words, a collective action problem 
emerges.  No single or small group of exporters is willing to invest the necessary lobbying 
resources to achieve the collectively desired outcome, at least not when the costs would be high 
(because of the anticipated truculence of opposing interests).80   
 
Secondly, concerning the import competing opposition, experience shows that it would 
be vehement, especially in defending trade remedy laws against direct effect.81  For import-
                                                 
79 See H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 1034 (1994). 
80 As one practicing trade lawyer described the situation to the author, direct effect 
is on the lobbying list of all major exporters, but it is Anumber 10" on their lists.  It does not rise 
to the top priority category and hence is not really taken seriously. Interview with Gary Horlick, 
Wilmer Cutler, and Pickering, Washington, D.C.  
81 Interview with Kenneth Freiberg, Deputy General Counsel in the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative. 
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competing interests, trade remedy laws are a front line of defense.  Even were trade 
negotiators to bargain away all overt protectionsim (zero tariffs, zero quantitative restrictions, 
and nondiscriminatory internal taxation and regulation), domestic industries could still fall back 
on antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard duties for protection.  These trade remedy 
regimes are legal under WTO rules.  And because the public does not understand such measures 
to be protectionist--to the extent that this matters--officials are permitted to favor free trade and 
“fair” trade in the same breath.  WTO rules nevertheless pose a potential threat, at least to robust 
enforcement of trade remedy law.  The basic thrust of the rules is to curtail excessively 
protectionist administration of these laws.  But even this runs against the interest of import-
competing industries. They are united in opposing that curtailment, and industries that are 
frequent users of trade remedy law have a strong and particularized interest in lobbying against 
such curtailment.   
 
From that perspective import-competing industries are strongly opposed to direct effect 
for WTO rules that seek to cabin protectionism.  The negotiated rules themselves inevitably 
contain ambiguities.  If direct effect is excluded, those ambiguities can be exploited in the 
political process required for implementing legislation.  
  
Direct effect for panel and Appellate Body decisions would pose an even greater threat to 
trade remedy law.  Domestic application of trade remedy rules through agency action and 
deferential court review still holds open avenues for the exertion of political pressure—especially 
through the agencies.  Panel and Appellate Body decisions at the WTO level would be insulated 
from such influence. Some commentators have complained that WTO decisions in this area have 
in fact failed to honor the carefully negotiated WTO rules requiring panel deference to domestic 
agency decisions. 82  Whether or not such claims are exaggerated, no one seems to doubt that the 
general thrust of WTO trade remedy rulings has been to curtail protectionism.  Clearly, import 
competing industries would not want those rulings to have direct effect. 
 
The import competing opposition to direct effect would also be buttressed by other 
interests.  Environmentalists, for example, ever distrustful of the WTO, would surely see direct 
effect as anathema and could be counted on to lobby mightily against it.  
 
The third factor concerns the self-interest of elected government officials. Here public 
choice theorists have consistently noted the advantages elected officials gain from a flexible, 
soft-law, non-direct-effect WTO regime.  Senators and Representatives will decry the loss of 
sovereignty brought about by direct effect, but sovereignty does not really seem at issue.  In a 
number of settings U.S. courts apply law taken from other legal systems, including customary 
international and treaty law, as a rule of decision without sovereignty being compromised.83  And 
                                                 
 82 See Daniel  Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: 
WTOReview of Anti-Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 109 (2002) 
83 See generally, Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 239 (2003). 
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even were Congress to grant the WTO direct effect, that grant would always be revocable 
through subsequent legislation.  The same would hold for any legislation attempting to grant 
WTO law supremacy within the U.S. legal system--however inconceivable in today’s world. 
Moreover, as John Jackson has pointed out,84 the increasingly interdependent, globalized world 
itself impinges most severely on national sovereignty, because no one nation, no matter how 
powerful, can achieve its ends unilaterally.  Bilateral and multilateral agreements—which entail 
constraint—are essential to national goals. 
 
If not concern over loss of sovereignty, then what does motivate elected officials to 
oppose direct effect?  Public choice theory points to the preference of officials for a flexible 
regime that allows them to maximize their own political support by being able to appeal to both 
sides of the liberal trade/protectionist divide.  Thus, they can negotiate and vote for liberal trade 
agreements that advantage exporters, and at the same time insist on retaining the option to renege 
on their own reciprocal commitments in the face of intense protectionist pressure at home.  The 
Dispute Settlement Understanding seems to capture this Janus-faced intent through provisions 
that do not spell out unequivocally an international law obligation to conform domestic law to 
WTO rulings.  As Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes have argued, this aspect of the WTO regime 
parallels the efficient breach concept in U.S. contract law theory.85  Their discussion suggests 
that the Abreach@Bor failure to conform domestic law--is efficient in the sense of maximizing the 
joint welfare of elected officials on both sides of the dispute.86  The obligation is still “binding” 
in the sense that a contract is binding.  The breaching party must pay damages, in the form either 
of substituted, but equally valued, trade concessions, or a willingness to suffer retaliatory trade 
restrictions without counter-retaliating.  Note that politicians’ support for vigorous trade remedy 
laws follows a similar logic in allowing regulatory escape from market access commitments 
through antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard protectionism.87   
                                                 
84 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 802 (2003).  
85 Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179, 179 (2002).  
For a contrary view see John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to >Buy Out’?, 98 AMER. J. INTL L. 109, 117 (2004); 
Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 2001 J. INTL ECON. L. 41, 59-61 (2001).  See 
also, Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 215, 
246-50  (arguing for specific performance as the proper WTO dispute settlement remedy).   
86 For example, conforming domestic law in A could cost official X in country A 
(importing country) 10 units of lost political support while benefiting official Y in country B 
(exporting country) only 2 units.  If country A fails to conform its law, official X gains 10 units 
of political support while official Y loses only 2.  Thus, the joint welfare of the two officials 
taken together is higher in the second scenario than in the first.   




Automatic internal applicability of WTO agreements and especially of rulings would 
thwart elected officials’ desire for flexibility.  Presumably the stronger the direct-effect regime 
contemplated, the stronger would be the disinclination of officials to adopt it.  A weak regime -- 
for example, the current U.S. model (“binding” dispute settlement having no direct effect and 
only muted indirect effect)—invites less opposition and carries a number of other advantages.  
One would be the exhortatory usefulness of a large, elaborately reasoned, and sophisticated body 
of case law interpreting WTO rules, but not requiring immediate or strict compliance.  For the 
sake of maintaining an effective world trading system member state executives face pressure to 
conform local law—or at least to seek that conformity from the legislature--but delay or 
complete refusal is acceptable when the political costs of compliance are too great—greater, for 
example, than the political costs of alternative trade concessions or retaliatory trade restrictions 
abroad.  Another advantage is the encouragement such a system gives to negotiating officials to 
take risks on new liberalizing commitments.  
 
In sum, the paradoxical U.S. support for binding dispute settlement coupled with 
opposition to direct effect (even to indirect effect) can be explained by three factors: (i) 
collective action problems for exporters (ii) vehement opposition to direct effect from import-
competing interests and environmentalists and (iii) preferences of elected officials for flexible 
“soft-law” commitments allowing them to optimize political support at home.   
 
 
IV. Prospects for WTO Direct Effect in Future Negotiating Rounds 
 
A. Quasi-Direct Effect in TRIPs and Government Procurement 
 
If this analysis is accurate--and barring some dramatic failure of the current dispute 
settlement system--one may doubt that the  United States would take seriously any proposal to 
give direct effect to WTO agreements or rulings  in the near future.  For particular agreements, 
however, a different conclusion might follow.  For example, in the TRIPS and Government 
Procurement Agreements the Uruguay Round actually introduced a kind of  quasi-direct effect, 
but for reasons that seem consistent with the political economic theory sketched above.  The 
discussion in the next two subsections maintains that these cases are best seen as exceptions that 
prove the rule, rather than counter-examples. 
 
TRIPS.    The TRIPS agreement generally obligates all WTO members to recognize 
various forms of intellectual property rights.  Adherence to the agreement is a prerequisite to full 
membership in the WTO and hence to its market opening benefits.  In Part III of the TRIPS 
agreement adherents are obligated to give what I have called quasi-direct effect to the agreement.  
A party must make available to private claimants an adequate system of enforceable rights and 
remedies within its domestic legal system in order to guarantee true adherence to its TRIPS 
                                                                                                                                                             
“Safeguarde”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 
58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991).  
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commitments.  This is of course not traditional direct effect, as domestic courts would enforce 
domestic statutes, not the TRIPS agreement itself.  Nevertheless private complainants would rely 
on domestic legal machinery to enforce intellectual property rights mandated by an international 
agreement.  Enforcement is not left exclusively to the WTO dispute settlement process, although 
if a member fails to enact the required domestic legal recourse, a complaining country could only 
resort to WTO dispute settlement procedures.  
 
This example accords reasonably well with the political economic theory set out above.  
In the TRIPS case the relevant exporters are those holding intellectual property rights who want 
to register, license, and enforce those rights abroad.  The quasi-direct effect of TRIPS is of 
interest only to the owners of intellectual property rights.  Thus there is less of a collective action 
problem.  There is a close connection between the rights IP owners seek and the need for local 
legal machinery in foreign countries to enforce those rights.  Export oriented IP owners benefit 
directly from such enforcement rights. More importantly, there are no import-competing 
industries in the IP owners’ home country even mildly opposed to this solution.  Import 
competing interests in the home country should welcome the actions of IP owners to enforce 
their rights.  In the trade context this leads to blocking infringing imports, not to stoking import 
competition. The absence of a protectionist lobbying force also means that elected officials have 
no real incentive to favor flexibility over judicially enforceable outcomes. 
 
Of course in countries that have not traditionally protected intellectual property, local 
producers accustomed to using pirated IP would oppose both acceptance of TRIPS commitments 
and giving them quasi direct effect.  But the political dynamic within a developed IP exporting 
country yields unidirectional support in the opposite direction—in favor of IP protection and the 
necessary domestic legal machinery to ensure effectiveness--not a split voice favoring 
commitments on one hand (to please exporters) and compliance flexibility on the other (to please 
import competing interests). Thus when the basic TRIPs commitment was struck, it was linked to 
quasi direct effect.     
 
Government Procurement Code.   The Uruguay Round also added a quasi-direct-effect 
element to the Government Procurement Code, presumably because of dispute settlement 
frustrations that arose under the Tokyo Round code.  In the well known Trondheim dispute88 the 
United States complained that the Norwegian City of Trondheim had violated the Procurement 
Code by not using open bidding on a contract to purchase highway toll collecting machines.  
Although the United States won the case, there was no available remedy for the disadvantaged 
U.S. enterprise that had wanted to bid on the contract.  The GATT panel was only willing to 
recommend that Norway bring its law into conformity prospectivelyBthe traditional GATT 
remedy.  There was no practical way to undo a procurement contract that had already been 
executed.  This was a systemic problem in the code.  Any future violation could again only be 
remedied by the respondent’s promise of prospective conformity--a remedy of no use to foreign 
enterprises interested in one-shot, non-repetitive government contracts.   
                                                 
88 See Norway--Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of 




The Uruguay Round Procurement Code addressed this problem by mandating local 
challenge procedures. Article XX, provides that an adhering country must provide for an 
effective challenge procedure before a local court or equivalent body available to any supplier 
who complains that a particular procurement is occurring in violation of the code.  The article 
specifically requires “rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement and to 
preserve commercial opportunities.”89  
 
In this example we can again see why export oriented suppliers seeking government 
procurement business would bundle together an open bidding commitment with an effective 
local court remedy.  Experience under the Tokyo Round Code dramatized for them that a right 
without an effective remedy was meaningless. The traditional GATT prospective remedy largely 
nullified the market opening advantages they had anticipated.  Collective action issues were thus 
minimized.  The issue did not concern all exporters, but rather that subset interested in 
government contract business.  Moreover, on the import competing front, at least in the United 
States and a good many other countries, challenge procedures were already broadly available in 
local law.  In this context, again, government officials had little to gain by insisting on flexibility. 
 
If the TRIPS and Government Procurement agreements are relatively unique in providing 
for quasi-direct effect, what are the prospects for a more generalized direct-effect regime for the 
WTO?  The next section turns to that question.   
 
 
B. Prospects for Generalized WTO Direct Effect 
 
1. Direct Effect As a Gift from the Judges  
 
It is well known that direct effect for European Community law had a transformative 
impact on European integration.90  It is less often emphasized, however, that the prime mover 
here was activist judicial decision-making, not government-to-government agreement.  The 
founding members of the European Economic Community certainly did not provide for direct 
effect in the EC treaty itself.  Rather, it was the Court of Justice that launched the new regime 
through its activist and creative Van Gend & Loos91 decision.  At the time of the decision most 
commentators would probably have considered the direct effect issue not to have fallen within 
the jurisdiction of EC law.  They would have considered the issue reserved for each Member 
                                                 
89 WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, art. XX(7)(a).   
90  See generally, J.H.H. Weiler,  The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE  L.J. 
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States’ constitutional law to decide.92   Nevertheless, in Van Gend & Loos the Court 
proclaimed that the EEC Treaty had created a “new legal order of international law” under 
which the ECJ itself could give direct effect to certain provisions of the EEC Treaty.93  Later in 
Costa v. ENEL94 the ECJ went a step further to proclaim the supremacy of Community law.95  As 
Joe Weiler has so cogently argued, these transformative decisions “‘locked’ the Member States 
into a communal … decisionmaking forum with a fairly rigorous and binding legal discipline.”96   
 
By contrast, the current state of weak integrationist commitment reflected in the WTO 
agreements virtually forecloses the possibility of the WTO following a similar path.  One panel 
has already concluded that WTO agreements do not have direct effect.  In an obvious reference 
to the pathbreaking language in Van Gend & Loos, the panel in the well-known Section 301 case 
observed: 
 
Neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by GATT/WTO 
institutions as a legal order producing direct effect.  Following this approach, the 
GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of which comprise both 
contracting parties or Members and their nationals. 97 
 
The “so far” qualifier might seem suggestive to some readers, but surely not even the Appellate 
Body has anywhere near the prestige, authority and legitimacy needed within the developing 
WTO legal order for a decision on the order of Van Gend & Loos.  As noted above, Joe Weiler 
has speculated why the Van Gend & Loos decision was accepted by Member State courts in the 
Community system.  I believe the most telling reason he elicits is that it correctly captured the 
true spirit of political and social commitment to an integrated community reflected in the EEC 
Treaty.  To use terminology and concepts recently developed by Joost Pauwelyn, the European 
Community Treaty created a multilateral/erga omnes partes/integral regime.98  Suspension of 
                                                 
92 See, e.g., the opinion of Advocate General Karl Roemer in the Van Gend & Loos 
case, Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 
1, at 35-47. 
93  Id., at 12. 
 
94 Case 6/64, 1964 ECR 585.   
95  J.H.H. Weiler,  The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE  L.J. 2403, 2428 
(1991)(stressing the importance of the lower courts’  willingness  throughout Europe to accept 
the judicial activism of Van Gend & Loos). 
96 Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, at 2429.   
97 United States--Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 
2000), para 7.72.  (emphasis in the original). 
98 See generally Joost Pauwelyn,  A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: 
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obligations (Weiler would speak of ASelective Exit@) on a bilateral basis is inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of such a regime.  Thus the Van Gend & Loos decision can be seen as the 
ECJ’s brilliant realization of this essential feature--the European commitment to a rule-of-law 
community reflected in the concept of a “new legal order.”  This is not true for the WTO.  As 
Pauwelyn insightfully explains, the WTO is instead a bilateral (or mulitiple bilateral) /reciprocal 
regime.99  Thus an attempt by the Appellate Body to follow in the footsteps of Van Gend & Loos 
would surely go awry.  It would represent a misunderstanding of the basic nature of the 
commitments and “ethos” 100 of the WTO.  
 




If the judicial path to WTO direct effect seems foreclosed because of the current nature of 
the WTO regime, is it conceivable that the WTO contracting parties would put direct effect on 
the negotiating table in the future?  Of course any answer would be speculative, but a number of 
observations seem merited.101   Even though the current dispute settlement understanding is far 
from perfect and commentators have proposed a range of possible improvements,102 from 
another perspective it has been a relative success.  Many more cases than ever before are now 
being brought, perhaps suggesting that increasing numbers of parties set stock in the 
adjudications.103 Moreover, the panels and the Appellate Body are developing a very elaborate 
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100 J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on 
the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Settlement, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 177, 180 
(2002) (describing how the recent preference for legalistic mechanisms in WTO dispute 
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101 For an unusually cogent and insightful discussion of many of the issues 
surrounding the problem of direct effect within the WTO system, see John H. Jackson & Alan O. 
Sykes, Questions and Comparisons, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 457-467 (John H. 
Jackson & Alan O. Sykes, eds., 1997).   
102  See, e.g., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO (Report by Consultative Board to the Director 
General, Peter Sutherland, Chair, 2005) (available at www.wto.org) (Chapter VI concerns the 
dispute settlement system).  
 
103 Alternatively, Robert Hudec argues that the larger number of disputes stems from the 
increased scope of provisions in the WTO vis-à-vis the GATT.  Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years,  8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
17 (1999).  
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body of generally, if not always, well-reasoned case law to flesh out the many previously 
untested concepts in the WTO agreements. In the United States we have noted that the Executive 
Branch generally urges compliance with WTO requirements.104  Similar predisposition toward 
compliance seems to exist in other countries as well.  There are notable exceptions, but they are 
still exceptions.  Given this general state of affairs and the unpromising political-economic 
dynamic posited above in Section III, it is difficult to see where the political support for WTO 
direct effect would come from.  Developing countries as a group might decide to champion 
direct effect, because for them compliance inducement through threatened or actual retaliation is 
often a chimera.   But are the true interests of the developing countries that weighty in the 
counsels of the WTO?   Direct effect is a favorite of many academic writers, but in the United 
States, at least, academic views do not readily translate into political action.  
 
Seeking direct effect for the WTO agreements themselves, though not for WTO rulings, 
would perhaps be the most feasible approach because it would be the least ambitious.  Political 
opposition would not be as great.   However, interpretations would vary from country to country 
and in many countries, including the United States, later statutes would take precedence.  Of 
course such explicitly non-conforming later enactments would be rare, and their availability 
could be seen as providing desirable flexibility.  Political forces weighty enough to overcome the 
transaction cost barriers to new legislation, especially legislation explicitly contravening 
previously approved WTO commitments, arguably should be accommodated.   If they could not 
be, then the political consensus needed to enter the international commitment in the first place 
would have to be that much stronger.  Given that such a safety value exists in U.S. law, one 
might wonder why direct effect for the WTO agreements was not adopted on pure and simple 
efficiency grounds as the least costly way of conforming U.S. law to the agreed commitments.  
 
There are several plausible responses to this last query.  One is that such an approach 
might have obscured for Congress precisely what changes in existing U.S. law were being 
effected.  Requiring implementing legislation clearly delineates which existing U.S. law is being 
modified.  A second explanation calls attention to the inevitable ambiguities that inhere in any 
multilaterally negotiated agreement.  Automatic direct effect would turn over to agencies and 
courts the power to choose from among the alternative meanings that compromise or open-ended 
language in an agreement could have.  On the other hand rejecting direct effect preserves for 
Congress, and accompanying interest group politics, the final decision--effected through 
implementing legislation--on that meaning.  Indeed, it also preserves the option for a certain 
amount of tension, if not outright inconsistency, between an implementing enactment and the 
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Indirect Effect.   
 
If direct effect limited to the agreements themselves seems infeasible for the reasons 
discussed, what can be said about the plausibility of agreed-upon indirect effect for those 
agreements--with or without the same treatment for dispute settlement rulings?  Just as the issue 
of direct effect for the agreements (without supremacy) becomes, as we have just seen, a choice 
between different interpreters--between a Congress that responds to interest groups on one hand 
and the more insulated agencies and truly insulated courts on the other--the issue of indirect 
effect for the agreements involves a similar choice.  This time, however, the choice is between 
the somewhat more politically motivated and attuned agencies, on one hand, and the more rules-
oriented, objective-constructionist courts on the other. A similar analysis would thus also apply 
to what is at stake in the choice.   
 
Protectionist interests would prefer to limit indirect effect and thus preserve greater 
policy space for the more politically responsive agencies.  The Executive Branch--though it 
generally favors WTO compliance--is certainly capable of responding to political pressure from 
import competing interests, especially when those pressures are severe.  As Jackson and Sykes in 
one context105  and Schwartz and Sykes in another106 have pointed out, legitimizing potential 
responsiveness to political pressures can achieve a kind of optimality—maximizing policital 
support for open trade by supporting open market initiatives (and honoring past commitments) 
whenever the costs to import competing interests are not excessive.  This in turn may lead to the 
adoption of more far-reaching trade liberalizing agreements in the first place.107  Thus 
categorically privileging Charming Betsy over Chevron--the judiciary over the more politically 
responsive agencies–which is what an indirect effect rule for the WTO would achieve--is not a 
choice with a foregone conclusion, even if one favors an open trading system.  
 
                                                 
105 John Jackson & Alan Sykes, Questions and Comparisons in Implementing the 
Uruguay Round 457, 462-463 (Jackson & Sykes, eds., 1997) (“[D]eviation from the letter of the 
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And if that choice respecting WTO agreements is not clear cut, it becomes easier to 
realize why indirect effect for WTO rulings would be even more difficult to achieve.  Most 
observers would probably agree that the panels and Appellate Body show an expected 
predisposition toward resolving WTO ambiguities in favor of greater trade liberalization, 
especially perhaps in the trade remedy area.108  Thus, giving indirect effect to WTO rulings 
would be a way of likely privileging the most trade liberalizing interpretation of the various 
constructions possible.  Again the proponents of flexibility and political responsiveness--trade-
remedy proponents and environmentalists in particular--would object.  Carve-outs for these 
interests would of course be conceivable, but then would the exceptions be in danger of 
swallowing the whole?  
 
The Stumbling Block: Want of a “Global Open Market Ethos” 
 
At the core of resistance to direct effect and even indirect effect, especially for WTO 
rulings, but also for the agreements themselves, is the nature of the commitments or obligations 
the WTO member states have undertaken.  Joe Weiler has spoken of the “rule of lawyers and the 
ethos of diplomats” to describe the difference between the new WTO and the old GATT,109 but 
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what is lacking in both conceptions is what I would call an “ethos of an open-market 
community,” a genuine commitment to open-market values and a welfare calculus trained on a 
higher, more aggregated level than the member state.  Such an ethos seems to exist for the 
European Community--whether driven in the main by fortress Europe motives or genuine 
political cohesiveness.  And it was brilliantly captured by the Van Gend & Loos decision on 
direct effect.  But no such ethos exists for the WTO.  At heart it remains, as Pauwelyn has so 
perceptively described it,110 a multilateral aggregation of essentially bilateral, reciprocal 
relationships.  The member states have not committed themselves to an open-market community 
in which there is a shared commitment to the immutable value within the community of 
community-level welfare.  The chief measure of policy is welfare within the member state, not 
welfare within the community.  What motivates WTO agreements is not the welfare of the 
collectivity but rather contract-style joint welfare maximization through mutual exchange--in 
essence an exchange of market access opportunities.  The measure of welfare is the joint welfare 
of two member states, or a series of multiple joint-welfare calculations, given that the WTO is a 
multilateral organization.  Or in public choice terms, the focus is on the maximization of the joint 
welfare of political officials in a series of bilateral country-to-country relationships. 
 
Contrast this conception with that of a human rights convention, such as the Genocide 
Convention, in which all nations are committed to a world community in which genocide is 
absolutely prohibited.  Violation of this community-level value harms all humans and cannot be 
tolerated.  A breach of the commitment within one member state never authorizes a suspension 
of commitments by other members.  The obligation is erga omnes.  To use the Schwartz & Sykes 
terminology, it is a regime of rights, of “property rights” or rather human rights-- in which 
specific performance is required.  The contract notion of “efficient breach” accompanied by 
payment of damages is out of bounds.  
 
The European Community is like this too.  The Member States have committed 
themselves to a “new legal order,” to a new community, a quasi-federal entity, which becomes 
the framework within which economic welfare is measured.  Within the Community, trade 
relations between Member States are no longer bilateral and reciprocal.  Rather, economic 
welfare is measured within the community as a whole, not as the sum of multiple bilateral joint-
welfare maximizing equations.  The Community has generated the famous “acquis 
communitaire,” where community-given rights reign supreme over local law and are enforceable 
through direct application in the courts of all Member States.  
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Again this is neither the prevailing “ethos” of the WTO, nor the commitment 
assumed by WTO members when they adhere to WTO agreements.  And in the near term, at 
least, there is no evidence that such an ethos is developing.  Indeed, before such an ethos would 
seem conceivable at a global level, one would expect to see it develop first regionally.  It has 
done so in the European Community.  In NAFTA there are some signs, equivalent to halting 
steps toward direct effect.  For example, under Chapter 18, binational panels decide the ultimate 
fate of antidumping and countervailing duty cases.  Likewise, under Chapter 11, arbitration of 
disputes between private parties and government investors yields damage awards enforceable in 
local courts.  Might such mechanisms be conceivable for the WTO?   Or perhaps even an 
arbitration based regime to award damages to private economic actors for egregious WTO 
breaches by member states?  To this author these suggestions seem too ambitious for the WTO at 
the current level of global interdependence and integration.   
 
 
V. Conclusion        
 
As we have seen, the WTO rules function as rules within the U.S. legal system only to 
the extent Congress faithfully captures them in implementing legislation or executive agencies 
conform their interpretation of ambiguous statutes to comply with WTO requirements.  Congress 
has blocked all direct effect for WTO law and arguably even all indirect effect—at least in 
judicial proceedings. Agencies may give weight to WTO rules, but not courts.  In the courts 
Chevron trumps Charming Betsy, not the other way around.  
 
This pattern seems likely to persist in the near future.  Surely neither the Appellate Body 
nor panels will declare WTO law a “new legal order.”  Negotiated direct or indirect effect seems 
also implausible.  The member states have so far not even committed themselves unambiguously 
to conform national law when a panel or the Appellate Body rules against them.  In Joe Weiler’s 
terminology, “Selective Exit” is tolerated.111   
 
For integrated, thickly interdependent communities the rule of “hard law” is appropriate.  
But for less integrated, more loosely interdependent communities, such as the global trading 
system,  a soft law regime more reliant for its effectiveness on the farsightedness and good will 
of the political branches—particularly the executive—in the leading countries (who have the 
most to gain and lose) seems inevitable.  Formulating commitments in legal terms generates 
some level of “compliance pull,” and the pull is important; it is just not decisive.  At least this is 
the author’s conclusion from a U.S. perspective.   
 
 
                                                 
111  Weiler, supra note 90, at 2412 (defining selective exit as “the practice of the [EU] 
Member States of retaining membership but seeking to avoid their obligations under the Treaty, 
be it by omission or commission”). 
